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Abstract—Latest generations of automobiles are gradually 
being equipped with technologies that have increasing automation, 
a trend which had led to increase in the system complexity as well 
as increased human-automation interactions. Failures in such 
complex human-automation interactions increasingly occur due to 
the mismatch between what operators know about the system and 
what the designers expect operators to know. Causes of road 
accidents also change due to role shift of drivers from controlling 
the vehicle to monitoring the in-vehicle controllers. Failures in 
such complex systems involving human-automation interactions 
increasingly occur due to the emergent behavior due to the 
interactions, and are less likely due to reliability of individual 
components. Traditional safety analysis methods fall short in 
identifying such emergent failures. This paper focuses on using a 
systems thinking inspired safety analysis method called System 
Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) to identify potential failures. 
The analysis focuses on a SAE Level-4 Vehicle that is controlled 
partially by a safety driver and its built-in Autonomous Driving 
System (ADS). The analysis yields that while increase in 
complexity does increase system functionality, it also brings a 
challenge to evaluate the safety of the system and potentially 
causes incorrect human-automation interactions, leading to an 
accident. After the possible inadequate driver-vehicle interactions 
are identified by STPA, corresponding requirements were then 
proposed in order to avoid the unsafe behavior and thus 
preventing the hazards. 
Keywords—STPA, systems thinking, human-automation 
interaction 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the last many decades, automotive systems have 
become increasingly complex, with the current luxury car 
having over 100 million lines of code [1]. The introduction of 
automation through various Advanced Driver Assistance 
Systems (ADAS) and Autonomous Driving Systems (ADS) 
have led to a significant challenge in terms of safety evaluation 
[2]. As the complexity of in-vehicle human-automation 
interaction has increased, so has the number of operational 
modes and the number of ways of triggering those operational 
modes. However, not only will unsafe system potentially lead to 
an accident, it also has a potential to lead to lack of trust in the 
systems [3]. Safety of a vehicle is usually linked to the reliability 
of the components within the vehicle. However, with 
technological developments in the last decades, component 
designs have become mature and possibility of individual 
component failure has dropped significantly due to their 
increased reliability. Failures in complex systems such as ADAS 
and ADS tend to occur due to emergent behaviour resulting from 
inadequate subsystem interactions. When a vehicle without any 
component failures is involved in an accident, the drivers are 
usually blamed as the causal factor, although they have 
performed as expected or as would be reasonable. One of the 
similar accidents reflecting this situation was the recent Tesla 
Autopilot crash [4]. The Tesla driver was blamed due to his 
disengagement to the vehicle control, however, the driver’s 
mental model was trained to believe that Autopilot system was 
capable of handling the situation, suggesting over-trust in the 
system, and lack of informed safety.  
Statistically, it is suggested that to prove ADS systems are 
safer from human-driven vehicles, they need to be driven for 
over 11 billion miles [5]. As this might seem reasonable, for 
complex systems, safety evaluation has had a shift from 
understanding “how a system works” to “how a system fails” 
[6], with a focus on quality of miles – “smart miles”. 
Considering Rumsfeld’s Known and Unknown Metrix [22], 
there are four quadrants representing different categories of 
hazards leading to accidents. The quadrant that represents 
unknown hazards has now become the challenges in the domain 
of safety.  
In the past few decades, many hazard identification methods 
have been used to identify “how a system fails”, including 
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) [7], [8], Fault Tree 
Analysis (FTA) [9], [10], Event Tree Analysis (ETA), Hazard 
and Operability Analysis (HAZOP) [11] etc. Most of the system 
failures identified by these methods are due to the 
inconsistencies between system performance and system 
requirements (assuming that the requirements are always 
correct) – i.e. they are known hazards. However, when the 
requirements are inadequate or become less adequate over time, 
the potential hazards of a system become unknown, leading to a 
large area with unknown hazards. A diverse range of causal 
factors of system failures therefore need to be considered.  
Whilst considering accidents in a human-automation system, 
there has been a variety of analysis methods developed since 
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1990s in order to identify causes of human errors in a socio-
technical system, including AcciMap Approach [12], Functional 
Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM) [13], Human Factors 
Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) [14], HERA-
JANUS [15] .etc. These methods commonly illustrate the 
diversity of causal factors across different levels of the systems, 
their interactions and the roles played by external influences 
such as political, cultural, financial and technical circumstances.  
When analysing causes of accidents using these methods, they 
are either based on retrospective accidents or are elaborate, 
requiring contributions from different teams. This also brings 
challenges when the deliverables of analysis are needed in order 
to facilitate the system development in a fast-paced engineering 
life cycle. Therefore, a new method is needed in order to identify 
a diverse range of prospective hazards efficiently. 
Contrary to the hazard identification methods mentioned 
earlier which consider accidents as a chain of events, systems 
thinking inspired System Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) 
believes that they occur most likely when external disturbances 
or dysfunctional interactions among system components are not 
adequately handled by the control system [16]. STPA can 
potentially identify causes which may not be identified by other 
methods, especially those concerning human-computer 
interaction, software bugs, missing requirements and even 
socio-technical factors and it prevents accidents by enforcing 
constraints on component behaviour requirements and 
interactions. While STPA was originally applied in space 
applications [17], more recently it has had wide applications 
across aviation, automotive, medical, defence and nuclear 
industries. 
II. STPA METHODOLOGY 
A. STPA Step 1: Define Purposes of the Analysis 
As a top-down approach, STPA starts by identifying any 
unacceptable losses, including loss of human life or human 
injury. STPA specified losses may not be limited to safety-
critical losses. For example, environmental pollution, loss of 
mission, loss of reputation may not be safety-critical, but they 
are also treated as losses in STPA because they are unacceptable 
to the stakeholders. 
The system boundary is then determined. System boundary 
defines the range of controllability – i.e. any components outside 
the system boundary are not controllable to the designer and any 
components within the boundary can be controlled or 
redesigned. In STPA, if a vehicle under analysis involves human 
control, the corresponding human drivers or operators are also 
treated as components of the system as they can be trained or 
guided to control the vehicle in a pre-determined manner. 
Once unacceptable losses have been determined, system-
level hazards are then identified. System-level hazards describes 
a system state or set of conditions that lead to a loss at a 
particular set of worst-case environment conditions. 
B. STPA Step 2: Model the Control Structure 
The aim of this step is to create a hierarchical control 
structure that is composed of nested feedback control loops 
between sub-systems. A generic feedback control loop is 
illustrated in Fig. 1. In general, a controller may provide control 
actions (CA) to control some process and to enforce constraints 
on the behaviour of the controlled process. The control 
algorithm represents the controller’s decision-making process – 
i.e. it determines the CA to be provided. Controllers also have 
process models that represent the controller’s internal beliefs 
and assumptions (i.e. its view of the outer world) used to make 
decisions. Process models may include beliefs about the process 
being controlled or other relevant aspects of the system or the 
environment. Process models may be updated in part by 
feedback used to observe the controlled process. For example, a 
driver provides ‘brake’ CA to the vehicle based on the ‘vehicle 
speed’ feedback from Human Machine Interface (HMI). Here, 
driver is telling the vehicle to slow down and HMI which is part 
of the vehicle is updating the driver with the current vehicle 
speed. 
C. STPA Step 3: Identify Unsafe Control Actions (UCA) 
After identifying CA in the control structure, each CA is 
further analysed to identify how the CA would manifest into a 
UCA. In a certain circumstance, a correct CA could lead to one 
or multiple system-level hazards (as identified in Step 1). If a 
CA were always unsafe, then it would never be included in the 
system design. To identify a UCA, the CA is usually considered 
together with a particular context and there are several 
guidewords that can be used to identify UCAs: 
 Not providing the CA leads to a hazard 
 Providing the CA incorrectly or when not needed 
leads to a hazard 
 Providing the CA too early or too late or in the wrong 
order leads to a hazard 
 Providing the CA too long or stopped providing the 
CA too soon leads to a hazard 
D. STPA Step 4: Identify Loss Scenarios and Requirements 
Once the UCAs are identified, each UCA is further analysed 
to identify the possible loss scenarios of the UCA. Loss 
scenarios are usually considered as the combinations of the 
process model belief, reasons for the belief and the 
corresponding causal factors, with the aid of the specific control 
loop of that CA as illustrated in Fig. 2. For a UCA to occur, the 
process model of the controller has a belief based on which it 
believes that the CA it is directing is safe when it is actually 
unsafe [18]. Decisions made by the process model could 
inevitably be incorrect if its belief is inadequate. In the 
meantime, the accuracy of the process model belief is 
significantly determined by the inputs it receives. 
 
Fig.  1 Generic Feedback Loop 
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Whilst analysing loss scenarios of UCAs from a Human 
Controller (e.g. Driver, Operator), the human mental model is 
applied. Unlike software decisions made by process model, the 
way humans make decisions depends on a tremendous amount 
on the context in which a particular decision is made [19]. The 
goal of applying STPA on human controller is not just to 
understand how the human operators think, but also to 
understand how and why they violate the safety constraints of 
the system. Fig. 2 also shows the human controller with three 
stages that includes receiving and processing information and 
selecting control actions. In order to identify the three stages, 
three questions need to be answered: 
 How did the operator choose which control action to 
perform? 
 What does the operator know or believe about the 
system? 
 How did the operator come to have their current 
knowledge or beliefs? 
For each causal factor identified, corresponding 
requirements are proposed either to prevent the causal factor or 
to enable the system to detect the causal factor [20]. Ideally, the 
causal factor shall be prevented as a top priority in order to avoid 
the UCA. However, it is also possible that the causal factor 
cannot be prevented and therefore, the back-up requirement is 
proposed so that the causal factor can be detected or exposed. 
III. STPA ON SAFETY DRIVER-VEHICLE INTERACTIONS 
Whilst there are nearly 40 UCAs from a safety driver, two 
example UCAs are analysed in this section in order to identify 
the diversity of causal factors of accidents involved in driver-
vehicle interactions. 
A. STPA Step 1: Define Purposes of the Analysis 
To start with, a list of losses are identified as presented in 
TABLE I. It is worth noting that neither L-3 nor L-4 in TABLE 
I are safety-critical losses, but they are indeed unacceptable to 
the stakeholders. 
TABLE I.  A LIST OF LOSSES 
Losses 
L-1 Loss of life or injury to drivers, passengers or pedestrians 
L-2 Loss of damage to the vehicle or objects outside the vehicle 
L-3 Loss of transportation mission 
L-4 
Loss of customer satisfaction or confidence on autonomous 
vehicle 
The system boundary in this analysis includes the 
Autonomous Vehicle and the safety driver. A list of vehicle-
level hazards are identified in TABLE II. It is important to note 
that the hazards here represent the system-level state, and 
therefore the conditions of subsystems are not considered in this 
step. Each system-level hazard could trigger more than one 
losses. For example, for H-1, collision with a pedestrian could 
cause death of the pedestrian or injury to the passenger (as per 
L-1), and vehicle might also be damaged (as per L-2). 
Inevitably, the transportation mission is terminated due to the 
accident (as per L-3). Consequently, the corresponding vehicle 
company will lose satisfactions and confidence from customers 
(as per L-4). 
TABLE II.  A LIST OF VEHICLE-LEVEL HAZARDS 
Vehicle-Level Hazards 
Link to 
Losses 
H-1 Collision with pedestrians, animals or other 
road users 
L-1,2,3,4 
H-2 Vehicle fails to follow pre-defined route L-3,4 
H-3 
Vehicle fails to follow road structures 
(roundabouts, junctions .etc.) 
L-3,4 
H-4 Vehicle fails to follow traffic rules L-3,4 
B. STPA Step 2: Model the Control Structure 
At the initial iteration of the analysis, a very high level of 
control structure was created as illustrated in Fig. 3. The control 
structure includes ADS, Brake-by-Wire system, sensors and 
actuators. At this abstraction level of control structure, the 
subsystems are considered as black boxes and therefore only the 
interactions among  the black boxes as well as the behaviour of 
each black box are analysed. The more detailed components 
inside each boxes are explored in the next iteration of the 
analysis. 
C. STPA Step 3: Identify Unsafe Control Actions (UCA) 
Some of the UCAs from Safety Driver are captured in 
TABLE III. For demonstration purposes, two example UCAs 
from Safety Driver are discussed in this paper.  
TABLE III.  A LIST OF LOSSES 
CA Press Brake Pedal 
Not Provided 
UCA-1: Safety Driver does not press brake pedal 
when current speed is higher than nominal speed and 
ADS is disabled (H-4) 
Provided 
incorrectly/when 
not needed 
UCA-2: Safety Driver presses brake pedal with 
insufficient amount when current speed is still too 
high for the sharp turn ahead. (H-2,3) 
Provided too 
early/too late 
UCA-5: Safety Driver pressed brake pedal too late 
when vehicle speed is not safe for the sharp turn 
ahead and ADS is disabled (H-2,3) 
Provided too 
long/stopped 
providing too 
soon 
UCA-7: Safety Driver stopped pressing brake pedal 
too soon when vehicle speed is still higher than 
nominal speed and ADS is disabled (H-4) 
 
Fig.  2  Human Controller Model for identification of Loss Scenarios of 
human operators[19] 
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In UCA-1, Safety Driver does not press brake pedal when 
the vehicle speed is already over the speed limit, this fails to 
comply with the driving law (as per H-4). Considering UCA-2, 
when vehicle speed is too fast for the sharp turn, although 
braking is applied, the amount is insufficient and it is very likely 
that the vehicle overshoots the road (as per H-3) and therefore 
not able to follow the pre-defined route (as per H-2). 
D. STPA Step 4: Identify Loss Scenarios and Requirements 
Once the UCAs are identified, possible loss scenarios of the 
UCAs are identified. For each UCA, there are many possible 
loss scenarios. In this section, two example UCAs will be 
discussed further and one loss scenario of each example UCA 
will be identified. 
1) Example UCA: Safety Driver did not press Brake Pedal 
Considering UCA-1 from TABLE III: Safety Driver does 
not press brake pedal when vehicle speed is higher than nominal 
speed (H-4). 
Fig. 4 shows the control loop for UCA from Safety Driver, 
together with a human controller model embedded. In order to 
identify the loss scenarios for the UCA, we first need to 
understand the reasons behind the choice of the control action 
by the human operator: 
 Safety Driver does not press brake pedal because of his 
driving skill. (C-1) 
 Safety Driver decides not to press brake pedal because 
he has to follow the rules. (C-2) 
 Safety Driver decides not to press brake pedal because of 
his knowledge of the vehicle system. (C-3) 
Secondly, we also need to know what the human operator 
knows or believes about the system based on each of the reasons 
above. Considering knowledge-based decision (C-3): 
 Safety Driver was believing that vehicle speed was still 
lower than nominal speed. (B-3.1) 
 Safety Driver was believing that the nominal speed did 
not change. (B-3.2) 
 Safety Driver was believing that ADS was operating and 
would slow down vehicle automatically. (B-3.3) 
And lastly, we need to identify how the operator comes to 
have their current knowledge or beliefs. Considering (B-3.3): 
 ADS status on HMI is incorrectly displayed. (CF-3.3.1) 
 ADS status on HMI is not updated properly. (CF-3.3.2) 
 ADS switch button performs multiple functions, which 
confuses the driver. (CF-3.3.3) 
Loss scenario with Causal Factor (CF-3.3.2) can be mapped 
in the Human Controller Model as shown in Fig. 5. The Human 
Controller Model describes how and why the safety did not press 
brake pedal. Safety Driver decided not to press brake pedal even 
though he was aware that vehicle was overspeed. The decision 
 
Fig.  3 A High Level Control Structure of the System under analysis 
 
 
Fig.  4 Control Loop for the UCA from Safety Driver 
 
 
Fig.  5 Safety Driver’s mental model that processes incorrect ADS status 
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was made based on his knowledge and beliefs about the ADS 
status. With the identification of the incorrect ADS status being 
displayed, the liability of the overspeed becomes convincing. In 
order to avoid the consequences of (CF-3.3.2), two requirements 
are proposed below: 
 Requirement to prevent (CF-3.3.2): When ADS is 
disabled, HMI shall update the ADS status immediately 
to inform driver. (R-1) 
 Requirement to detect (CF-3.3.2):  When ADS status 
is not properly displayed on HMI, warning messages 
shall be displayed to inform the driver. (R-2) 
2) Example UCA: Safety Driver pressed Brake Pedal 
Considering UCA-2 from TABLE III: Safety Driver presses 
brake pedal with insufficient amount when current speed is still 
too high for the sharp turn ahead. 
Same as the previous example, In order to identify the loss 
scenarios for the UCA, we first need to understand the reasons 
behind the choice of the control action by the human operator: 
 Safety Driver did not press brake pedal with sufficient 
amount because of his driving skill. (C-1) 
 Safety Driver did not press brake pedal with sufficient 
amount because he had to follow the rules. (C-2) 
 Safety Driver did not press brake pedal with sufficient 
amount because of his knowledge of vehicle system. (C-
3) 
Secondly, we also need to know what the human operator 
knows or believes about the system based on each of the reasons 
above. Considering knowledge-based decision (C-3): 
 Safety Driver was believing that vehicle has already 
reached safe speed for the sharp turn. (B-3.1) 
 Safety Driver was believing that the turn was not that 
sharp. (B-3.2) 
 Safety Driver was believing that ADS was operating and 
would help with the deceleration. (B-3.3) 
And lastly, we need to identify how the operator comes to 
have their current knowledge or beliefs. Considering (B-3.2): 
 The in-vehicle navigation map displays incorrect road 
structure. (CF-3.2.1) 
 The in-vehicle navigation map is not updated properly. 
(CF-3.2.2) 
 The vehicle body design increases Safety Driver’s blind 
spot in terms of the surroundings. (CF-3.2.3) 
Fig. 6 shows the Safety Driver’s mental model when 
processing Causal Factor (CF-3.2.1). Safety Driver was not 
aware of sharp road bend ahead due to blind spot. As in-vehicle 
map was the only information of forward road structure Safety 
Driver was receiving, he was trusting it although it was 
incorrectly displaying a smooth bend ahead. As a result, Safety 
Driver did not press brake pedal deeply enough, bringing the 
vehicle into an unsafe condition. In order to avoid consequences 
of (CF-3.2.1), two requirements are proposed below: 
 Requirement to prevent (CF-3.2.1): In-vehicle 
navigation map shall always be synchronized with real-
world roads. (R-1) 
 Requirement to detect (CF-3.3.2):  When there is a 
mismatch between actual road and map, HMI shall 
inform driver. (R-2) 
IV. DISCUSSIONS 
Two example UCAs have been discussed to demonstrate the 
applicability of STPA methodology on human-automation 
interactions. Considering safety driver’s mental model in 
example UCA-2, in an ideal condition, a safety driver shall be 
well-trained with sufficient knowledge of controlling the vehicle 
and its automation system. Safety drivers select control actions 
based on their beliefs on the process state that information 
provided by vehicle systems are always correct, the process 
behaviour that map system will warn them if something is not 
right, and the surrounding environment they can see. When the 
information is inadequate or not updated properly, the mental 
model is updated with incorrect inputs, and therefore control 
actions that have been safe might become unsafe, i.e. UCA. As 
identified in the loss scenario of UCA-2, safety driver was not 
aware of the current environment (i.e. sharp turn) due to the 
blind spot, the control action (insufficient braking torque) that 
was believed to be safe was implemented by the safety driver, 
which was based on the information from in-vehicle map and 
the driver’s trust in the capability of vehicle system. However, 
due to the causal factor that incorrect information was displayed 
on the map (i.e. CF-3.2.1), the knowledge-based actions (C-3) 
that safety driver believed were correct became unsafe (i.e. 
UCA-2), which potentially could lead to the hazards of collision 
with oncoming vehicles (i.e. H-1) or leaving pre-defined route 
(i.e. H-2). Furthermore, this could also affect safety driver’s 
belief on the vehicle automation system on a long term basis, in 
which case safety driver might choose not to rely on vehicle 
automation systems at all (i.e. L-4). This violates the original 
intentions of designers, engineers and other stakeholders. 
To ensure that the original intentions of building the system 
are not violated, the system design can be improved to ensure 
that the information is always correct (i.e. R-1). The possibility 
of UCAs can also be minimized if safety driver is informed of 
the abnormal system behaviour (i.e. R-2), in which case safety 
 
Fig.  6 Safety Driver’s mental model that processes incorrect Map 
Information 
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driver is confident to make skill-based decisions to control the 
vehicle manually. Rather than blaming the driver for being the 
cause of the human error, system designers need to consider the 
factors influencing driver’s mental models. This includes the 
consideration of how much effort the operator would require to 
access necessary information of the system. For example, an 
elaborate user manual handbook for the multi-functional vehicle 
control system covers all the necessary information, but it might 
not be that user friendly. As a result, most of drivers decide not 
to read through the handbook before starting their driving 
experiences with the vehicle. 
Traditionally, if an accident occurs, analysts usually identify 
what the driver could have or should have done to prevent it 
[19]. Applying STPA on human-automation interactions allows 
analysts to identify possible combinations of human operators’ 
beliefs on current process state, process behaviour and 
environment, together with their mental model updates. This 
helps analysts identify causes of accidents that were unknown. 
This could trace back to the difficulties associated with 
communications between vehicle HMI and drivers, the 
complexity of control modes available for drivers, the accuracy 
of the vehicle system, and even the inadequate decisions made 
by the vehicle manufacturing company who treats profits as a 
higher priority rather than safety. In the meantime, applying 
STPA also helps analysts identify what other control actions 
human operators could provide. As the system under analysis is 
still in the development phase, STPA as an prospective hazard 
identification method helps optimize the system in safety aspect 
as well as saving payments of potential accidents due to current 
system design flaws. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
Process of STPA methodology has been discussed in this 
paper, along with two examples focusing on safety driver 
behaviour to demonstrate the applicability of STPA in 
identifying accidents relating to human-automation interaction. 
In the complete STPA analysis on the subject Vehicle System, 
80 man-hours were spent and in total 18 Control Actions were 
identified, from which 205 UCAs were derived. This includes 
37 UCAs from Safety Driver. From these 205 UCAs, 1850 
causal factors were captured with 233 causal factors identified 
from Safety Driver UCAs. Among the UCAs and loss scenarios 
identified there is some fraction of unknown hazardous cases. 
Applying STPA also allows requirements to be generated 
directly and 3700 requirements have been proposed in this 
analysis to optimize the safety aspect of the system as well as 
the user interface design [21]. Part of the requirements will also 
be used as training instructions for Safety Drivers. 
As part of the future work, it is important to verify the 
effectiveness of the analysis by testing. STPA as a hazardous 
scenario identification tool can be further extended for testing 
purposes. Building on Hazard Based Testing approach [6], 
STPA inspired test scenarios and test cases can be identified by 
parameterizing UCAs and loss scenarios to acquire test scenario 
parameters and pass criteria for testing in both real world and 
simulation world [21]. In the meantime, existing process still 
requires manual inputs to identify UCAs, and the quality and 
coverage of the analysis are therefore dependent on the 
knowledge and experience of the analysts. Therefore, future 
work is also needed to formalize the process of identifying 
UCAs to capture more unknown hazards. 
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